Corporate ownership, governance and tax avoidance: An interactive effects by Annuar, Hairul Azlan et al.
 Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  164 ( 2014 )  150 – 160 
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
1877-0428 © 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of the School of Accountancy, College of Business, Universiti Utara Malaysia.
doi: 10.1016/j.sbspro.2014.11.063 
ScienceDirect
International Conference on Accounting Studies 2014, ICAS 2014, 18-19 August 2014, Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia 
Corporate ownership, governance and tax avoidance: An 
interactive effects 
Hairul Azlan Annuar, Ibrahim Aramide Salihu*, Siti Normala Sheikh Obid 
Department of Accounting, International Islamic University Malaysia 50728 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 
Abstract 
Although tax avoidance practices are as old as taxes themselves, the ways they are being perpetrated among 
corporate taxpayers have transmuted so sophisticated in recent times. This study thus proposes models for 
empirical investigations into the relationship between corporate ownership structure and corporate tax avoidance in 
Malaysia. It was argued, based on cost/benefits consideration of tax avoidance, that family; foreign and 
government ownerships could be associated with corporate tax avoidance among Malaysian listed companies. The 
study further proposes that strong governance mechanism could mitigate such association. Two econometrics 
dynamic panel data models are proposed for the investigation. Generalized Method Moment (GMM) estimator is 
recommended as the estimation method. 
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1. Introduction 
The issues of tax avoidance have been problems since the inception of tax legislations and are prevalent in 
every society where taxes are levied (Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, 1998; Uadiale, Fagbemi & Ogunleye, 2010; 
Verboon & Dijke, 2007). This menace is even more prevalent among corporate taxpayers given the magnitude of 
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the company income taxes. The fact that taxes take away greater proportion of the firms’ pre-tax earnings and 
subsequently reduce their distributable profits could be a reason for the endless war against corporate tax 
avoidance†. While there are several anti-avoidance laws in almost every country, corporations around the world do 
employ expensive accountants to find increasing complicated ways of paying less taxes (Daily Mail, 2010). As 
such, Hundal (2011) argued that corporate tax avoidance seems to be the most challenging issue of our generation 
as it represents a serious loss of revenue to the governments of many developed and developing economies. 
Several studies have therefore been conducted to understand the determinants of tax avoidance among 
corporate taxpayers. These studies have examined several factors such as firm size and scale of international 
operations (Rego, 2003; Richardson & Lanis, 2007; Zimmerman, 1983), capital intensity, leverage (Noor, Mastuki 
& Bardai, 2008; Richardson & Lanis, 2007; Stickney & McGee, 1982), executives’ roles and their compensations, 
industrial membership (Mahenthiran & Kasipillai, 2012; Shevlin & Porter, 1992), the legal form of organization 
(Tedds, 2006) and political connections (Adhikari, Derashid & Zhang, 2006) to understand the variations in firms’ 
tax burdens across industry. However, the studies assume that firms make their tax reporting decisions with no 
agency consideration and influence from the board (i.e. given consideration to organizational legitimacy). They, 
therefore, provide little insight to the determinants of tax avoidance in a corporate setting where there is a 
segregation of ownership from control and legitimacy issues. 
Given this backdrop, Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) called for the investigation of ownership structure as 
likely determinant of corporate tax avoidance given its importance in the corporate setting. Afterward, Chen, Chen, 
Cheng and Shevlin (2010) and Landry, Deslandes, and Fortin (2013) documented negative relationships between 
family ownership and corporate tax avoidance in US and Canada respectively. Also, government ownership has 
been established to be related to tax avoidance in varying directions (Adhikari et al., 2006; Chen, Mo and Zhou, 
2013; Kim & Zhang, 2013; Law, Yuan, McIver & Burrow, 2012; Mahenthiran & Kasipilai, 2012; Wu, Rui & Wu, 
2013; Zhang & Han, 2008). Similarly, Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga (2001); Egger, Eggert & Winner (2010); 
Kinney and Lawrence (2000) and Law et al., (2012) have documented consistently positive relationship between 
foreign ownership and tax avoidance. 
On the other hand, various attributes of the board have been documented to impact corporate tax avoidance. For 
instance, Minnick and Noga (2010) found a negative significant relationship between board composition and 
corporate tax avoidance among S&P 500 firms. A similar negative relationship between the two variables was 
documented by Lanis and Richardson (2011) among Australian companies. Also, Vafeas (2010) found a negative 
relationship between board composition and corporate tax avoidance among Fortune 500 companies. However, 
Mahenthiran and Kasipilai (2012) found a significant negative but partial relationship between the two variables 
among Malaysian listed companies. These findings suggest the mitigating effect of the board on company’s tax 
avoidance activities. 
While the studies so far have investigated the relationship between corporate tax avoidance and these various 
forms of corporate ownership, the joint effect of the three forms of ownership has not been investigated. It is a 
known fact that these forms of corporate ownership do overlap in the corporate environment given the public 
nature of these companies. It will therefore be worthwhile to investigate the joint effect of these forms of corporate 
ownership on corporate tax avoidance to better our understanding of the latter. In addition, the documented 
negative impact of board composition – a measure of board independence – on corporate tax avoidance suggests 
the potential intervening role of corporate governance on the relationship of corporate tax avoidance with these 
forms of corporate ownership. Thus, investigating the interactive effect of corporate governance on such 
relationship will further enhance our understanding on the behaviours of the corporate taxpayers. Thus, our study 
is unique in proposing econometric models for investigating the joint effect of the three forms of corporate 
ownership on corporate tax avoidance with corporate governance’s interaction. 
The nature of corporate ownership in Malaysia provides a fertile ground for this investigation. Besides the 
concentrated nature of her corporate ownership, the three forms of ownership are also prevalent in the Malaysian 
business environment. According to Claessens, Djankov and Lang (1999), 67.2% of the public listed companies 
_________ 
 
† The term corporate tax avoidance is defined, in line with Dyremg, Hanlon and Maydew (2008) and Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), as the 
reduction in the explicit corporate tax liabilities. The term is used throughout this paper though it could be interchangeably used with tax 
management, tax planning and tax aggressiveness (Tang and Firth, 2011).   
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were family-owned and a proportion of 28.3% of market capitalization is in the hand only 15 families.  Also, 
Government Linked-Companies (GLCs) have an approximated 36% of the Bursa Malaysia market capitalization 
with 54% composite index (Khazanah, 2012). The country also witnessed an increase of 30% in the amount of 
foreign direct investments (FDIs) from $9.1 billion in 2010 to $11.9 billion in 2011 (MIDA, 2012). A preliminary 
investigation into the ownership structure of the top hundred companies listed on Bursa Malaysia in 2011further 
revealed that 29% of the companies have both government and family ownerships and 19% have both government 
and foreign ownerships. 
The remaining parts of the paper are organised as follows: section 2.0 provides the literature review and thus 
covers issues like the benefits and costs of tax avoidance; corporate ownership and corporate tax avoidance; and 
corporate governance. Section 3.0 gives the proposed empirical method of the paper which the sample source of 
data; modals specification and variables measurements; and the proposed estimation method. Section 4.0 presents 
the conclusion of the paper. 
2. Literature review 
The fact that taxes are deductions from the cash flows available to a firm, and hence the dividends distributable 
to the shareholders, suggests that firm owners would strive to maximize their wealth through various tax avoidance 
practices. However, such benefit of increased cash flows from tax avoidance practices is accomplished with certain 
non-tax costs. This demands the costs/benefits consideration of such practices and the choice of tax avoidance if 
the benefits outweigh the associated costs. Thus, the benefits and the associated costs with corporate tax avoidance 
are discussed here. Prior to this discussion, little insights are provided on the meaning and measures of corporate 
tax avoidance to give proper ground for the discussion. 
 
2.1 Meaning and measures of corporate tax avoidance 
The term corporate tax avoidance lacks universal definition as it might connote “different thing to different 
people” (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010:137). The fact that there is consequential tax effects for every transaction of a 
company, meant to increase its profit, could account for such lack of universal definition. Given this, they have 
been several definitions of corporate tax avoidance put forward by researchers in recent times (for a review of 
these definitions see: Salihu, Sheikh Obid & Annuar, 2013; Salihu 2014). Here, we define corporate tax avoidance 
as a reduction in the explicit corporate tax liabilities. This definition is in line with Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) 
that describe tax avoidance “as a continuum of tax planning strategies where something like municipal bond 
investments are at one end (lower explicit tax, perfectly legal), then terms such as ‘noncompliance’, ‘evasion’, 
‘aggressiveness’, and ‘sheltering’ would be closer to the other end of the continuum” (p. 137). Thus, the terms 
such as tax management; tax planning; tax sheltering; and tax aggressiveness are interchangeably used with tax 
avoidance in the literature (see for instance: Chen et al. 2010; Lanis & Richardson, 2011; 2012; Minnick & Noga, 
2010; Tang & Firth, 2011). 
Similar to its definition, they have been several measures ‡  of corporate tax avoidance used in the prior 
literature. These measures are mostly based of the estimates from the financial statements and could be classified 
into three groups. The first group includes those measures that consider the multitude of the gap between book and 
taxable income. These comprise of total book-tax gap; residual book-tax gap and tax-effect book-tax gap. The 
second group has to do with those constructs that measure the proportional amount of taxes to business income. 
These include effective tax rates (this comes in several variants like accounting ETR; current ETR; cash ETR; 
long-run cash ETR; ETR differential; ratio of income tax expense to operating cash flow; and ratio of cash taxes 
paid to operating cash flow). The third group involves other measures such as discretionary permanent differences 
(PERMIDIFF)/DTAX; unrecognized tax benefits (UTB); and tax shelter estimates. 
_________ 
 
‡ For in-depth discussions on the measures of corporate tax avoidance based on financial statements estimates and the studies that have used 
each measure refer to Salihu et al. (2013). 
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Despite this plethora of measures of corporate tax avoidance used in the tax literature, its conforming aspect 
remains uncaptured as most of the measures are computed based on items that are affected by accrual accounting 
procedures. To this end, Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) suggested a measure for conforming tax avoidance as the 
proportion of cash tax paid to operating cash flow. Salihu, Shiekh Obid and Annuar (2013) documented the 
significant difference of this measure from other similar measures. This study proposes the use this measure for the 
empirical investigation given the context§ of the study. 
2.2 Benefits and costs of tax avoidance practices 
The most obvious benefit of being tax avoidant is the cash savings from the taxes avoided. The cash savings 
lead to increased cash flow to the firm which offers it the opportunities for further investments and in turn 
increases the firm’s value. The shareholders' wealth is also enhanced in terms of more dividends, and increased 
shares value. The managers are also not left out of these benefits given the compensations for effective tax 
management. In fact, the managers’ compensations are determinants of tax avoidance practices in most cases. 
As such, several studies have documented the links between tax avoidance and managers’ incentives looking 
from different perspectives. For example, Phillips (2003) found that compensating managers based on after-tax 
results is associated with lower effective tax rate (ETRs). Similarly, Slemrod (2004) developed a model for the link 
between tax avoidance and manager compensation. A similar model development was carried out by Desai and 
Dharmapala (2006) wherein equity-based incentives are theoretically linked with tax avoidance. Both models 
suggested a link between tax avoidance practices and managers' compensations. Using a different approach, Frank, 
Lynch and Rego (2009) found a link between earnings management and tax avoidance. This suggests that the 
managers are being compensated for effective tax planning. More empirically, Rego and Wilson (2010) 
documented a positive relationship between tax aggressive planning and option vega for managers. Further, 
Robinson, Sikes, and Weaver (2010) documented that firms with tax departments treated as profit centres pay 
fewer amounts of taxes. This means that tax managers are compensated for tax avoidance. However, a study by 
Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker (2012) documented no relationship between tax directors’ compensations and tax 
avoidance. The authors concluded that tax matters are influenced more by the top management team than the tax 
director as an individual.  
These reported studies show that managers are being compensated for tax planning based on the tax savings 
from the taxes avoided. However, it has been argued that the nature of the compensation contracts between the 
fund providers and professional managers seems incomplete. This is because the owners lack the full knowledge of 
the tax planning activities of the managers (Armstrong et al., 2012) which gives rooms for hidden actions that may 
be detrimental to the very existence of the firm (Croker and Slemrod, 2005). The second reason for this is that tax 
avoidance activities are mostly illegal, which are not enforceable in court of law. Thus, the case of a breach of 
contract is left for moral consideration (Chen and Chu, 2005). Accordingly, Chen and Chu (2005) argued that tax 
avoidance leads to loss of internal control in case the managers act selfishly given the incomplete nature of the 
contract. It could therefore, be said that despite the compensations for effective tax management, managers may 
still pursue their personal interests through tax planning. 
This notion of personal interest of managers in tax planning was further investigated in Desai and Dharmapala 
(2006). The authors argued that, with high-powered incentives, managers tend to avoid more taxes without 
resources' diversion in the better governed firms. They, therefore, concluded that tax avoidance and rents 
extraction are complementary and that the structure of corporate governance could mediate this interaction. Their 
study suggests a new form of agency cost for tax avoidance. It could be said that the general notion about tax 
avoidance as a transfer of wealth from government to shareholders is questionable in the corporate setting. 
Apart from this agency cost of tax aggressiveness and the loss of internal control highlighted above, there are 
other non-tax costs associated with corporate tax avoidance activities (Scholes, Wolfson, Erickson, Maydew & 
Shevlin, 2005). Besides the opportunity costs of the fund used for tax management, one most significant non-tax 
_________ 
 
§  The capturing of conforming tax avoidance within the context of the present study is very crucial as corporate ownership is highly 
concentrated with less capital market pressure, thus, firms could place less importance on accounting earnings’ reporting and as such try to 
conform their book and tax treatments. Consistent with this, Adhikari, Derashid and Zhang (2005) found the practice of reducing the book 
income prior to changes in corporate tax rate among Malaysian large companies. 
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cost is the likely penalty that may be imposed by the tax authority (Chen et al., 2010). This may arise after the 
firm’s avoidance activities are detected through the tax audit conducted by the authority. While the additional tax 
payments and fines imposed by the tax authority may affect the cash flow available to the firm, their impacts are 
more on the firm’s reputation.  
The reputational risks of tax avoidance have dual effects on the firm’s existence. First, the organizational 
legitimacy of the firm is being questioned by the general public. The general public perceives a legitimate firm to 
be socially responsible by contributing to the economic well-being of the society wherein it operates (Christensen 
and Murphy, 2004). Thus, any act of tax avoidance may threaten the very existence of the firm (Preuss, 2010). 
However, this could only happen when the public becomes aware of the existence of such social irresponsibility 
provided there are mechanisms for public information access. Second, the other shareholders could also react by 
discounting the firm’s share prices when they perceive the managers to be using the tax avoidance activities to 
mask rent extraction (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006). Although, the shareholders stand to benefit from tax savings 
coming from taxes avoided, the complementary nature of tax avoidance and rent extraction always put them in a 
dilemma in favouring tax avoidance practices. Thus, the outside shareholders usually perceive the potentiality of 
rent extraction whenever taxes are avoided (Chen et al., 2010). Consistently, empirical studies have documented 
supports for this notion. For instance, Desai, Dyck and Zingales (2007) found an increase in market values of 
companies that faced high level of enforcement on tax compliance in Russia. More explicitly, Hanlon and Slemrod 
(2009) documented a sharp decline in the share prices of companies with information about tax aggressiveness 
through the public media.  
However, the reactions of the shareholders are more pronounced in a less-concentrated ownership setting with 
efficient capital markets that serve as the mechanism for minority shareholders' protection. But in a concentrated 
ownership environment with an emerging market, the reactions of the other shareholders might not be felt 
seriously. This is because the firms have little incentives for public legitimacy as they seek little or no fund from 
the markets. Therefore, the costs and benefits of tax aggressiveness for firms may differ depending on the nature of 
ownership structure. This accounts for one of the reasons Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) argued for ownership 
structure as a potential determinant of tax avoidance. The other reason is the fact that corporate ownership is a 
‘core issue in corporate governance’ (Hua & Zin, 2007:34) and determines the nature of the agency problems 
arising in the corporate environments. 
Summarily, while tax aggressiveness benefits the firm and shareholders in form of tax savings, the potential 
non-tax costs associated with it may also be large depending especially on the structure of corporate ownership and 
control. These non-tax costs include loss of efficiency in internal control, agency costs of rent extraction, potential 
penalty, potential price discount and damage to organizational legitimacy. 
    
2.3 Corporate ownership and corporate tax avoidance 
Given the argument to investigate ownership structure, corporate governance as a potential determinant of 
corporate tax avoidance, this paper proposes econometric models for investigating the associations of three forms 
of ownership with corporate tax avoidance in Malaysia together with corporate governance interactive effects. The 
models are developed with regards to the benefits and costs of tax avoidance in a concentrated ownership setting 
with an emerging market discussed above. Three forms of corporate ownership are proposed for investigation. 
These are family, government and foreign ownerships. The reasons for these forms of ownership and the likely 
relationship with corporate tax avoidance including that corporate governance are detailed out as follows. 
 
2.3.1 Family ownership and tax avoidance 
The structure of family businesses has a different and unique agency conflict with reference to costs and 
benefits of tax avoidance and requires further investigations. The appointment of executives on the board of family 
businesses is largely influenced by the family members for continuous maintenance of their relevance in the 
control of the firm (Peng & Jiang, 2010). This influence suggests the congruence of interests of the firm’s owners 
and that of the hired managers. To put differently, there is an alignment of both interests. Given this, tax savings 
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from the taxes avoided and/or rent extraction through managerial opportunism serves as benefits of tax avoidance 
for family firms (Chen et al., 2010).  
However, there is the presence of the principal-principal agency problem between the majority and the minority 
shareholders (Young et al., 2008). This suggests the likelihood of share price discount by the minority shareholders 
which represents a cost of tax avoidance for family firms. In addition to the reduction in share price, potential 
penalty imposed by tax authority and damage to organizational legitimacy constitute another cost of tax avoidance 
for family firms. It is therefore, reasonable to conclude that the costs and benefits of tax avoidance are both large 
for family firms. 
However, the associated costs of tax avoidance practices are less than the benefits for family firms in a 
concentrated ownership environment. The potential share price discount by the minority shareholders may not be 
visible in a concentrated ownership environment due to emerging nature of the capital market. Thus, the only 
likely cost of tax avoidance for family firms in such a setting is the potential penalty imposed by the tax authority. 
Although, this may have effect on the cash flow of the family firms, its reputational effects seem less as they seek 
little capital from the market because of the presence of major shareholders who provide the required funds. 
However, it is unclear empirically whether family firms are tax avoidant in a concentrated ownership setting such 
as Malaysia (Liew, 2007; Thillainathan, 1999) given the likelihood of the benefits outweighing the costs. Thus, 
this paper proposes a positive relationship between family ownership and corporate tax avoidance. 
 
2.3.2 Government ownership and tax avoidance 
The presence of government ownership of shares in companies characterized such companies as Government-
linked Companies (GLCs) (Lau & Tong, 2008). The benefits of tax avoidance seem higher for GLCs than the 
associated costs. While the GLCs benefit from the increased cash flows from the taxes avoided, the only feasible 
cost of tax avoidance for these companies is potential rent extractions by the managers. This is because the 
companies are not directly managed by the government. As for the issue of share price discount, GLCs are not 
subject to capital market scrutiny as they seek little capital from the market given the timely interventions by the 
government (Mohd Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Naser & Nuseibeh, 2003). Also, the potential penalty imposed by 
tax authority resulting from tax audit exercise is not feasible for GLCs because of their political connections 
(Faccio, Masulis & McConnell 2006). 
However, it is quite surprising that there is a lack of studies examining the effects of government ownership 
and tax avoidance, especially in the developed economies. The plausible reason could be the absence of such form 
of ownership in those economies. For developing economies, like Malaysia, government involvements in business 
activities cannot be ruled out as the nature of the capitalism tends to be relationship-based and rather than market-
based (Adhikari et al., 2006; Gomez, 2002). As such, studies like Chen et al. (2013); Kim and Zhang (2013); Law 
et al. (2012); Wu et al. (2013); and Zhang and Han (2008) investigated the relationship between government 
ownership and corporate avoidance in China and documented negative relationship except for Zhang and Han 
(2008). 
In Malaysia, Adhikari et al. (2006) and Mahenthiran and Kasipilai (2012) investigated similar relationship 
among Malaysian listed companies but with divergent findings. These divergent findings need further 
investigation given the cost/benefits analysis above. This paper thus proposes a positive relationship between 
government ownership and corporate tax avoidance in Malaysia based on the cost/benefits analysis of tax 
avoidance. 
                     
2.3.4 Foreign ownership and tax avoidance 
Foreign ownership of shares has been associated with high profitability and efficiency (D’souza, Megginson & 
Nash, 2001; Smith, Cin & Vodopivve, 1997). However, the presence of foreign investors has been linked with tax 
aggressive practices (Christensen & Murphy, 2004). Empirically, US multinational companies are found of paying 
low taxes in their host countries despite their high profitability level (Grubert & Mutti, 1991; Hines & Rice, 1994; 
Kinney & Lawrence, 2000).  
Despite this, the relationship between foreign ownership and tax avoidance has only being studied outside the 
developed nations by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2001). Using data generated from eighty countries across the 
Globe and focusing on the banking sector, the authors found that the foreign banks pay lower taxes than their 
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domestic counterparts in the host countries. While this study provided an insight to the effects of foreign 
ownership on tax avoidance contrary to the general notion that foreign investors always conform to international 
best practices, the finding is limited to the banking sector. It is therefore important to have insight into the effect of 
this form of ownership on tax avoidance within the host countries such as Malaysia given the inflow FDIs into the 
country. The paper therefore proposes a positive relationship between foreign ownership and corporate tax 
avoidance in Malaysia. 
 
2.4 Corporate governance and corporate tax avoidance   
The characteristics of the board of directors have been argued to be most effective mechanism in management 
monitoring (Ibrahim, Howard & Angelidis, 2003). As such, studies have documented the effect of board 
characteristics on corporate tax avoidance (Minnick & Noga, 2010; Lanis & Richardson, 201; Vafeas, 2010). This 
paper therefore proposes the interactive effect of board composition on the relationships between corporate 
ownership and corporate tax avoidance.   
3. Empirical method 
This section details out the proposed empirical research methods for this study. These include the sample 
selection and the justification for such selection. The empirical model specification, variables’ measurements and 
the model estimation method are also discussed here. 
 
3.1 Sample source of data 
 
The Malaysian companies listed on the main market of Bursa Malaysia are targeted as the source of data for the 
proposed investigation. It is believed that these companies are under the strict monitoring of the Board and they 
need to meet all its listing requirements. The study proposes a time-frame of five years from 2009 to 2013. These 
years are focused given the steady rate of corporate tax at 25% over the period. 
  
3.2 Models specification and variables measurement 
 
Given the dynamic nature of the panel data described above and in line with Minnick and Noga (2010), this 
study imposes a standard linear relationship between corporate tax avoidance and the explanatory variables with 
some control variables documented to influence firms’ tax burdens in prior studies. The first model is written as: 
 
ܥܶܣ௜௧ ൌ Ƚ௜ ൅ ϒܥܶܣ௜௧ିଵǦ ൅ ߚଵ݂݈ܽ݉݅ݕ௜௧ ൅ ߚଶ݃݋ݒ݁ݎ݊݉݁݊ݐ௜௧ ൅ ߚଷ݂݋ݎ݁݅݃݊௜௧ ൅ ߚସ݂ݏ݅ݖ݁௜௧ ൅ ߚହ݌ݎ݋݂݅ݐ௜௧ ൅ ߚ଺݈݁ݒ௜௧
൅ ߚ଻ܿܽ݌݅݊ݐ௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ሺͳሻ 
 
The subscripts i and t denote firms and year respectively. CTA is corporate tax avoidance measured as the 
proportion of cash tax paid to operating cash flow.  ߙ௜ is the constant term, ϒ, ߚଵ to ߚ଻ are slopes to be estimated 
and ߝ is the error term of the model. Family denotes family ownership and measured as the proportion of family 
members on board (Wan-Hussin, 2009). Government stands for government ownership and it is to be measured as 
percentage of shares owned by government institutions to the total shareholding of the companies (Mohd Ghazali 
& Weetman, 2006). Foreign means foreign ownership and measured as the proportion of companies’ shares held 
by foreign investors (Mohd Ghazali, 2010). Firm size, profitability, leverage and capital intensity are control 
variables found to impact firms’ tax burden. These are denoted as fsize, profit, lev and capint respectively. Fsize is 
measured as the natural logarithm of firms’ total assets, profit as return on assets (ROA), lev as total debt to total 
asset and capint as property, plants and machinery to total assets. These measures are similar to those found in 
studies like Adhikari et al., (2005); Chen et al. (2010); and Derashid and Zhang, (2003). The coefficient of lagged 
dependant variable, ϒ, is expected to be positive. Going by the proposed direction of the relationships ߚଵto ߚଷ are 
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expected to be negative. Similar negative signs are also expected for ߚସ  to ߚ଻ based on the findings in prior studies 
(Adhikari et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2010; Derashid & Zhang, 2003). 
The second model for investigating the interactive effect of corporate governance is given as follows: 
ܥܶܣ௜௧ ൌ Ƚ௜ ൅ ϒܥܶܣ௜௧ିଵǦ ൅ ߚଵ݂݈ܽ݉݅ݕ௜௧ ൅ ߚଶ݃݋ݒ݁ݎ݊݉݁݊ݐ௜௧ ൅ ߚଷ݂݋ݎ݁݅݃݊௜௧ ൅ ߚכଵሺ݂݈ܽ݉݅ݕ௜௧ ൈ ܤ݋ܽݎ݀ܿ݋݉௜௧ሻ
൅ ߚכଶሺ݃݋ݒ݁ݎ݊݉݁݊ݐ௜௧ ൈ ܤ݋ܽݎ݀ܿ݋݉௜௧ሻ ൅ ߚכଷሺ݂݋ݎ݁݅݃݊௜௧ ൈ ܤ݋ܽݎ݀ܿ݋݉௜௧ሻ ൅ ߚସ݂ݏ݅ݖ݁௜௧
൅ ߚହ݌ݎ݋݂݅ݐ௜௧ ൅ ߚ଺݈݁ݒ௜௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܿܽ݌݅݊ݐ௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ሺʹሻ 
  Where boardcom denotes board composition and it is measured as the proportion of independent non-
executive directors on board (Esa & Mohd Ghazali, 2012). If corporate governance has an interactive effect on the 
relationships of the forms of corporate ownership and corporate tax avoidance, the signs of the coefficients ( ߚכଵ, 
ߚכଶ and ߚכଷ ) are expected to be positive and statistically significant while the coefficients (ߚଵ,ߚଶ and ߚଷ) remain 
positively significant. 
The inclusion of the lagged dependant variable ϒܥܶܣ௜௧ିଵ  is to take care of potential endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables. Three sources of endogeneity in corporate finance-related studies have been identified as 
omitted variables, simultaneity and measurement errors (Robert & Whited, 2012). Wintoki, Linck and Netter 
(2010) argued that most internal corporate governance researches are with endogeneity issues which many 
researchers take less cognizance of. Thus, Minnick and Noga (2010) considered endogeneity to be present in 
corporate tax management issues. In line with this argument, this study controls for potential endogeneity and that 
accounts for the choice of the models above (eq. 1 & 2). The likely source of endogeneity in the present study is 
simultaneity. While the presence of the other two identified sources in Robert and Whited (2012) - omitted 
variables and measurement errors - cannot be deemphasized, simultaneity is the most feasible source in the context 
of tax management. The prior year avoidance strategies of a tax avoidant firm do transcend to the subsequent year. 
The possibility of this transcendental effect gets increase under self-assessment system. Under the self-assessment 
system in Malaysia, corporate taxpayers are expected to estimate their tax liabilities and submit same to the Inland 
Revenue Board of Malaysia given the current-year basis of assessment. The estimated tax liabilities should not less 
than 85% of the prior year estimate or revised estimate. The companies are also allowed to revise these estimates 
during the assessment period. This makes the companies tax planning activities continuous yearly and the 
likelihood of prior year’s avoidance strategies extending to the current year. As such, the empirical model above 
control for this endogeneity and assumes the exogeneity of the regressor. 
 3.3 Estimation method 
 
Given the dynamic nature of the panel data, the standard pooled regression model, fixed or random-effect 
models will be seriously biased given the presence of firm specific effect and the lagged dependant variable 
(Ibrahim & Law, 2013). These models will be biased due to the serial correlation of the error term. Even when it is 
assumed that the error term is not auto correlated, the models will still be biased and inconsistent given the likely 
correlation of the lagged dependent variable with the error term (Nickell, 1981). The use of generalized method of 
moment (GMM) estimator has been advocated in this situation (Arellano & Bond, 1991). With GMM, the specific 
firm effects or time-invariant effects could be easily eliminated and the likely autocorrelation of the error term 
created by first-order difference could also be wiped off through the second-order difference. Specifically, 
Blundell and Bond (1998) recommended the of use system GMM in place of the difference GMM when the time 
period in panel data is small. Thus, this study proposes the use of system GMM estimator for the analysis of the 
above model given the three years’ time period. The approach is similar that of Minnick and Noga (2010) and 
Wintoki et al. (2010). 
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4. Conclusion 
The present paper proposes econometrics models for the study of the likely determinants of corporate tax 
avoidance in a concentrated ownership setting with an emerging market. Specifically, the proposal focuses on the 
link between corporate ownership structure and corporate tax aggressive planning and identifies three forms of 
corporate ownership that could be associated with tax aggressiveness. The identification was premised on the 
potential costs and benefits of tax aggressiveness looking from theoretical perspective. The paper proposes the 
likely interactive effect of corporate governance on such associations. The relevance of both agency and legitimacy 
theories in understanding the corporate tax behaviour was also regarded. Summarily, family, government and 
foreign ownerships are proven as the potential determinants of corporate tax avoidance with potential interactive 
effect of board composition. The proposed models also considered some relevant control variables given their 
influences on firms’ tax burden. It is hope that the proposed models could be tested empirically and findings being 
a useful guide for the selection of companies for corporate tax audit and investigation. 
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